Dytiatin
Causes, course, analysis and effects of the battle
Dytiatin
Causes, course, analysis and effects of the battle
Causes, course, analysis and effects of the battle
Causes, course, analysis and effects of the battle
When the Polish Army defeated the Red Army in the great Battle of Warsaw in August 1920, there was general euphoria in the country. The rejection of Mikhail Tukhachevsky's Western Front from the gates of the capital and the simultaneous defeat of Semyon Budyonny's "invincible" Cavalry Army at Komarov broke the entire Russian offensive in the northern and central sectors of the front. The Bolsheviks, forced into a humiliating retreat, were pushed back 180-200 km from Warsaw within a few weeks.
The enemy still retained combat capability, and fresh reinforcements were arriving from Russia, creating the risk of a renewed Soviet offensive in the future. The Supreme Command of the Polish Army decided to give a general battle to the Bolsheviks in the area of Grodno, where Tukhachevsky's troops were gathering, retreating from Warsaw. However, before this decisive battle, which went down in history as the Battle of the Niemen, began, it was necessary to take care of the southern wing, so that it would not be excessively exposed in the coming offensive. To this end, the enemy forces had to be driven out of Volhynia and Eastern Lesser Poland, occupied by the Bolsheviks since June.
On September 14, the offensive of the Polish 6th Army of General Robert Lamezan-Salins (two days later, General Stanisław Haller, hero of the Battle of Warsaw, took over its command) in Eastern Lesser Poland began. The autumn battles in the south also involved units of the Active Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic - Poland's only real ally in the war with Soviet Russia.
The Polish 8th Infantry Division of Gen. Stanisław Burhardt-Bukacki set off from the positions it had occupied for several weeks on the Dniester and Świr, east of Lviv, towards Podhajce. Its 13th Infantry Regiment, under the command of Captain Jan Rudolf Gabryś, headed for Rudniki, west of Podhajce, attacking in the middle of the division's sector, between the XVIth Infantry Brigade on the right, marching directly towards Podhajce, and the 33rd Regiment, attacking Telacze on the left.
The Bolsheviks put up a stiff resistance and most of the forces of the 13th Regiment were engaged in combat on the first day of the offensive in the villages of Herbutów, Kunaszów and Bołszów on the road to Rudniki. The next day, Capt. Gabryś, reading the not very optimistic reports from the line commanders, began to fear being left behind by the neighbouring formations of the 8th Division, which, although with difficulty, were advancing on both sides of him. Therefore, he formed a combat group based mainly on the strength of the 3rd battalion, which he pushed along the road to Rudniki, without waiting for the end of the fighting behind it. On the one hand, Gabryś's decision was dictated by the desire to maintain the continuity of the front line and to keep up with the pace of the attack of the neighbouring formations, but on the other hand, it caused the dangerous division and spreading out of the attacking forces in the face of the still well-organised and dangerous forces of the enemy. The battle group consisted of the 9th and 10th companies of the 3rd battalion, a machine gun company, a technical company, a telephone platoon and a troop of mounted scouts, supported by an artillery unit assigned to the 13th Infantry Regiment of the 8th Artillery Brigade. This was the 3rd division under the command of Captain Władysław Domański (whose adjutant was 2nd Lt. Kazimierz Kaliszek), consisting of two batteries: the 7th battery of the 8th Field Artillery Regiment under the command of 2nd Lt. Zygmunt Gużewski and the 4th battery of the 1st Mountain Artillery Regiment commanded by Captain Adam Zając. Three of the four artillery officers mentioned were to die in the coming battle.
On September 16 at 9:00 a.m., Gabrysia's combat group took the village of Dytiatyn and pushed the weak Bolshevik unit out of Hill 385 (marked on military maps by its absolute height), rising above the northeastern edge of the village. Shortly after that, the captain rode his horse to a hill that offered an excellent view of the surrounding area. Through binoculars, he noticed a large force of infantry and cavalry approaching the hill.
They were Red Army soldiers retreating from their positions on the Gniła Lipa River near Rohatyn. Rohatyn was taken by the 37th Infantry Regiment on September 9, but for several days the Bolsheviks counterattacked, trying to retake the city. However, when, after the general offensive of the Polish 6th Army began, the Soviet 8th Cavalry Division "Red Cossacks" fighting near Rohatyn and its supporting formations found themselves in danger of being encircled, the enemy gave up further counterattacks and began to retreat. The most convenient route of retreat led through the Dytiatyn area. Knowing that the Polish 13th Regiment was delayed in its march, but not that Gabryś had formed a combat group and was pushing it east despite everything, the Bolsheviks moved in that direction and unexpectedly encountered Polish forces on Hill 385.
When the 1st Battalion of the 13th Regiment reached Dytiatyn on the morning of September 16, after finally driving the Red Army soldiers out of their line of attack, Gabryś decided to change his previous decision and send this unit further east, to Rudniki, and left his combat group of 600 soldiers, 6 cannons and 6 machine guns on the hill, which occupied old trenches from the times of World War I. Around 2,200 Bolsheviks were marching towards them. In this way, the enemy achieved a tactical numerical advantage of 3.6:1 over the Polish units. The defenders of Hill 385 were left alone. No one could come to their aid, because there were no other Polish units in the area, and what's more - at that moment, the safety of the northern flank of the XVIth Brigade, attacking towards Podhajce, rested on them.
In his later explanations, Capt. Gabryś explained that he could not tell from a distance whether a Soviet or Polish unit was approaching; in fact, the reborn Polish state was struggling with major supply problems at the time and many units of the Polish Army did not look much better than the Bolsheviks. However, the unrecognized unit was approaching from the north-east, a direction from which Polish reinforcements were not expected. The forces left by Gabryś on the hill were much smaller than the approaching formations, which created a risk of their destruction if they turned out to be enemy troops.
Neither side planned a decisive battle in the Dytiatyn area. The town was simply another name on the map. The clash took place on the march, as a result of the collision of some offensive Polish troops and a large gathering of Bolshevik forces, which, while retreating, unexpectedly encountered the enemy and spontaneously went into a local counterattack. Historians call such battles "encounter battles."
The Bolshevik forces consisted of one brigade of the Soviet 8th Cavalry Division and the 366th Rifle Regiment of the 123rd Rifle Brigade: 1,000 bayonets, 1,200 sabers, 5 cannons, and 20 machine guns. When the approaching unit was already close enough to be undoubtedly recognized as the enemy, it was fired upon by the Poles with all available weapons and repelled with heavy losses. The Bolsheviks withdrew from the hill and fired upon it with their own artillery, destroying one of the Polish cannons. The nearly eight-hour battle of Dytiatyn began.
At around 11:00, the Soviet infantry and dismounted cavalry carried out a frontal attack, which was repelled far from the Polish trenches. Shortly afterwards, the enemy attempted a cavalry charge against the flank of the Polish defence, but the formation was broken by Polish machine gun fire. The battlefield was littered with the bodies of Bolshevik cavalrymen and horses. At 13:00, a third attack began, supported by Soviet artillery fire. The Red Army soldiers searched for gaps in the Polish defence, probing the fields of fire with a series of pinpoint strikes. Captain Gabryś sent a warning report to the command of the XVI Brigade, whose flank would be completely exposed if the defence of Dytiatyn fell.
After 2:00 p.m., a Soviet cavalry unit managed to locate the edge of the right flank of the Polish defense, bypass it, and occupy the village of Boków, thus emerging behind the Polish units. This created a very dangerous situation for the defenders, but instead of continuing the attack, the Bolsheviks began to plunder the village. This allowed them to send one of the platoons of the 9th Company, held in reserve until then, in time to drive the Cossacks out of the village. After these events, Gabryś decided to begin a retreat from Hill 385, but not to the west, from where he had come, but to the south, i.e. towards the XVI Brigade, so as not to expose its flank. Before 4:00 p.m., the most "sensitive" units began to withdraw, i.e. the supply wagons, the technical company, the telephone platoon, the command, and the mounted reconnaissance. Second Lieutenant Gużewski, the only artillery officer to survive the battle, left the hill with them.
Almost at the same time, the Bolsheviks began their fifth attack. The cavalry managed to break through to the left wing of the Polish defense, and the first hand-to-hand combat took place. The formed ad hoc a group of artillerymen, fighting like regular infantry armed with rifles, went into contact and saved the defensive line for the time being, pushing the enemy out of the trenches. However, only 15 minutes later the enemy launched a sixth attack. The Polish artillery fired its last shells, and all machine guns fell silent due to overheating of the barrels and mechanical damage. The soldiers were also starting to run out of ammunition for their personal weapons. Both infantry companies withdrew from the hill, moving south. Only the 2nd platoon of the 9th company, which had been covering the artillery positions since the beginning of the battle, remained there.
This group was surrounded in the place where the tombstone church was to be built later, and where the Dytiatyn War Cemetery is now. The highest ranking, living soldier still present on the hill was then Capt. Antoni Zając, commander of the 4th battery. He went down in history as the commander of the defense of this last redoubt. The Bolsheviks, tired after a whole day of constant fighting, shouted at the Poles several times to surrender. However, knowing that their resistance would allow them to cover the retreat of their retreating colleagues, they decided to continue fighting until the end.
We will never know what exactly happened, because no one on the Polish side survived it, and the Soviet accounts have not been preserved. We can only guess some of the details of the clash based on the battlefield inspection made the following day. Probably Capt. Zając and 2nd Lt. Wątroba, who was fighting next to him, personally killed several Bolsheviks at close range, because some of the bodies of the fallen enemies bore traces of being hit in the face by pistol ammunition, and at that time only officers carried handguns. Both were hacked to death with sabres. After their deaths, the last living officer on the hill, 2nd Lt. Świebocki, died with a rifle in his hand, which he had taken from a private who had fallen earlier. With no ammunition left, the Poles defended themselves with bayonets, sapper shovels, and even stones and bare fists. Before sunset, they were all dead.
After dark, the Bolsheviks would rob the bodies, often stripping them naked and brutally mutilating them. The wounded were finished off. Some bled to death until the next morning.
In the Battle of Dytiatyn, 97 Polish soldiers died and 86 were wounded. Soviet losses are unknown, but they were certainly high. Despite the tactical failure and heavy losses suffered by Polish units on Hill 385, the resistance of the defenders of Dytiatyn was significant both at the tactical and operational level. The Poles held the Soviet forces for a whole day, covering the flank of the Polish XVI Infantry Brigade and the Ukrainian Cavalry Division operating in the south. If the defenders of Dytiatyn had not held out, the Bolsheviks would have destroyed these forces, which would have threatened the entire southern sector of the Polish-Bolshevik front. It cannot be ruled out that such a situation would have changed the course not only of the campaign in the south, but even of the entire war.
Due to the delay in the march and exhaustion from the day-long battle, the Red Army did not continue the pursuit of the Poles south from Dytiatyn, but withdrew eastward as initially planned. The very next day, the battlefield was re-occupied by units of the 13th Regiment approaching from the west. Despite this, the day after the battle, Capt. Gabryś lost command of the regiment for the defeat and the loss of the battalion and artillery at Dytiatyn. On the one hand, he did indeed make a number of mistakes in the art of war: having too few forces, he tried to fight in two places at the same time and did not adjust his actions to the changing situation on the battlefield. He stubbornly pursued the rigorous implementation of operational goals in accordance with the plan once adopted, without showing the flexibility, ability to predict and change priorities that should characterize a good field commander. On the other hand, the Battle of Dytiatyn was led by a tragic accident and a turn of events unfavourable for the Poles, as a result of which the attacking troops collided with a Bolshevik unit retreating from another sector of the front that should not have been there.
The defeat at Dytiatyn and the dismissal from the position of commander of the 13th Infantry Regiment had a negative impact on the further course of Gabryś's military career. For his participation in the entire Polish-Bolshevik War, he received only the Medal of Independence, although his colleagues commanding regiments emerged from it decorated with the Cross of Valour and Virtuti Militari. Although he was promoted to major two years later, for most of the interwar period he held mainly training and administrative positions, often in small towns, which veterans of two wars, such as Gabryś, considered a place of exile. He did not take command of the regiment again until 1939. Together with his new unit, the 52nd Kresy Riflemen Infantry Regiment from Złoczów, he fought in the September Campaign against his former enemies as a lieutenant colonel. Taken prisoner by the Red Army, he was sent to a POW camp in Starobelsk, from where in April 1940 the NKVD took him to Bykivnia near Kharkov and shot him.
The Battle of Dytiatyn immediately became a legend. Throughout the interwar period, its history was promoted as a symbol of the heroism of Polish soldiers in the fight against the Bolshevik invader, similar to the Battle of Zadwórze fought a month earlier, in which 330 volunteers under the command of Captain Bolesław Zajączkowski delayed the Bolshevik offensive on Lviv. However, in the times of the Second Polish Republic, Dytiatyn was better known.
The Chief of State, Marshal Józef Piłsudski, personally awarded the 4th Battery of the 8th Artillery Brigade, which defended itself until the end on Hill 385, the title of the Battery of Death, and the name DYTIATYN was engraved on one of the columns surrounding the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Warsaw. For this small battle in the scale of the entire war, as many as 17 Silver Crosses of the Order of Virtuti Militari were awarded, all posthumously. In addition, 11 officers and 41 privates of the infantry received the Crosses of Valor. At the site of the battle, exactly where the Battery of Death fought and where the fallen were buried in a fraternal grave, a tombstone church was built under the invocation of St. Teresa, at which twice a year: on the national holiday of May 3 and on the anniversary of the battle of September 16, solemn celebrations were organized and Holy Masses were celebrated with the participation of the army, government officials, veterans, families of the fallen and the local population.
After World War II and the loss of the Eastern Borderlands by Poland, the cemetery church was destroyed by the Soviet authorities, and the Dytiatyn War Cemetery was not rebuilt until 2015. Today, it is hard to resist the impression that the subject of the Dytiatyn Battle remains largely forgotten, despite attempts to bring it back to the common consciousness of Poles. In its place, the Battle of Zadwórze has become much better known.
After 1989, only one small book about the Battle of Dytiatyn was written, by historian and former opposition activist Janusz Odziemkowski, a specialist in the Polish-Bolshevik war. According to him, two factors determined the defeat of the Polish forces: euphoria after the recently won Battle of Warsaw, which meant that the Bolsheviks were already considered defeated, while in the south their forces had not yet been defeated and still posed a serious threat, as well as an error in the command of Captain Gabryś, consisting in underestimating the potential of the enemy forces. Odziemkowski appreciates the significance of the battle and believes that it was of key importance for maintaining the planned course of the autumn campaign of 1920 in the south.
Lech Wyszczelski, a military historian and retired Polish Army colonel, has a different opinion on the Battle of Dytiatyn. In his monumental monograph entitled Polish-Russian War of 1919-1920 he expresses the opinion that the battle as such did not have any major significance on the scale of the entire front, and owes its "popularity" mainly to the mythologization from the times of the Second Polish Republic.
During religious ceremonies, the Christian dimension of the sacrifice made by the last defenders of Hill 385 is very often emphasized. The "Death Battery", even unable to retreat after its position was completely surrounded, could have simply surrendered. However, Captain Zając's soldiers chose death over the possibility of surviving in captivity, because they knew that every moment of their resistance would tie up the Bolshevik forces and make it harder for them to pursue the Polish troops retreating to the south. Therefore, they acted in accordance with the Gospel commandment: "This is my commandment, that you love one another as I have loved you. Greater love has no one than this, that someone lay down his life for his friends" (John 15:12-13).
Regardless of the assessments, the Battle of Dytiatyn is one of only a few battles in Polish history (five or six, depending on the studies) that has been called Polish Thermopylae. This term refers to clashes that were characterized by a huge disproportion of forces in favor of the opponent and the unwavering attitude of defenders fighting to the last man. They are compared to the battle fought by the Spartans with the ancient Persians in the gorge of Thermopylae in 480 BC.
The difference is that no American director has ever come to Dytiatyn to film this battle.
Bibliography
Marcin Więckowski
"Co-financed by the Minister of Culture and National Heritage from the Culture Promotion Fund, obtained from surcharges established in games covered by the state monopoly, in accordance with Article 80 paragraph 1 of the Act of 19 November 2009 on gambling”
Accessibility Tools
